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Using a panel of Colombian banks and quarterly data between 1996:1 and 2010:3,
we study the relationship between short-run adjustments in bank capital bu⁄ers
and the business cycle. We follow a partial adjustment framework and control for
several variables that have been identi￿ed as important determinants of bank cap-
ital bu⁄ers in previous studies, and ￿nd that bank capital bu⁄ers vary over the
business cycle. We are able to identify a negative co-movement of capital bu⁄ers
and the business cycle. However, we also ￿nd that capital bu⁄ers of small and
large banks behave asymmetrically during the business cycle. While the former
appear to be constant over time, once the appropriate set of control variables is
used, the latter present a countercyclical behavior. Our results suggest the possi-
ble need of the implementation of regulatory policy measures in developing coun-
tries.
JEL Classi￿cation: C26; G21; G28.
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Studying the time-series behavior of banks￿capital bu⁄ers is important for at
least two fundamental reasons. First, capital requirements have become one of
the main instruments of today￿ s banking regulation. Following the Basel accord,
￿nancial institutions￿supervisors around the world follow closely the capital ratio
of the institutions they regulate and impose minimum requirements. Arguably the
main objective of Basel II is to create a closer liaison between banks￿risk taking
and individual capital requirements. In order to promote a sound asset and liabil-
ity management, the current regulatory framework pretends to stimulate banks to
hold an adequate level of capital which corresponds to their risk-taking decisions.
Clearly, appropriate capital levels vary during the business cycle. There is ample
evidence showing that the probabilities of observing counterparty credit rating
downgrades and defaults is quite di⁄erent during economic expansions and during
cyclical downturns (see, for instance, Kavvathas (2000), and G￿mez-GonzÆlez and
Hinojosa (2010)). During an economic upturn ￿rms and households perform well
and are less prone to committing default on their debt obligations than during an
economic downturn. Thus, the amount of bank capital required to cover against
unexpected losses depends on the state of the business cycle. Given that capital
is costly, it will not be optimal for banks to hold a constant level of capital across
time, and thus observed capital bu⁄ers should ￿ uctuate during the business cycle.
Second, the literature on capital crunch shows that under capital regulations the
capitalization ratio is important for ￿nancial institutions when they are taking
decisions on portfolio composition (see Peek and Rosengren (1995), and Estrella
et al (2000)). Particularly interesting, as shown by Van den Heuvel (2009), bank
capital regulations might have an e⁄ect on bank lending and on the response
of lending to monetary policy actions in a dynamic setting. If the market for
bank equity is imperfect, banks cannot readily issue new equity at all moments
in time1. Therefore, in the presence of minimum capital requirements, banks forgo
pro￿table lending opportunities to reduce the probability of falling below the reg-
ulatory minimum levels in the future in case credit risk materializes. There are
1There is ample theoretical (see. for instance, Myers and Majluf (1984), and Stein (1998))
and empirical support (Cornett and Tehranian, and Calomiris and Hubbard (1995)) for the
assumption that issuing new equity can be costly, and that the cost might depend on banks·
individual characteristics.
1explicit as well as implicits costs for falling below the minimum capital require-
ment. Explicit costs depend on the particular regulatory design of the country in
which the bank operates and relate to penalties and restrictions imposed by the
supervisor. Implicit costs deal with the e⁄ect of the penalization of a bank on its
depositors￿behavior.
Bank capital bu⁄ers are de￿ned as the excess capital maintained by ￿nancial in-
stitutions at a given point in time. If capital markets were perfect, the optimal
capital bu⁄er will be set to zero for all banks, because it would be ine¢ cient to
maintain idle capital which is more costly to hold than insured deposits. How-
ever, in the presence of imperfect equity markets, capital can not be raised with-
out cost. Therefore, it might be optimal for ￿nancial institutions to hold positive
capital bu⁄ers.
Banks will hold di⁄erent levels of capital depending on their individual character-
istics, such as their access to equity markets, the levels of risk they assume, and
their size, and also on the stage of the business cycle. The decisions they take on
the amount of capital they withhold a⁄ect lending, and thus the transmission of
monetary policy to the economy.
The dependence of capital bu⁄ers on the business cycle may have a negative im-
pact on macroeconomic stability. Empirical studies have shown that banks￿cap-
ital bu⁄ers of Western European banks ￿ uctuate countercyclically over the busi-
ness cycle (Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004), Jopikii and Milne (2008), and
Stolz and Wedow (2011)). Banks undertake a riskier behavior during times of eco-
nomic expansion, expanding their loan portfolio without building up their capital
bu⁄ers accordingly. In a bust, when banks observe the materialization of credit
risk, those poorly capitalized will face the possibility of falling below the mini-
mum required levels. Therefore, they will have to either issue new equity or in-
crease their capital bu⁄ers reducing lending. Given that raising capital is specially
hard during economic downturns when capital is scarse and costly, many banks
have to cut lending in a considerable proportion. The resulting reduction in loan-
able funds experimented by ￿rms and households ampli￿es the magnitude of the
economic recession.
In this paper we study the behavior of Colombian banks￿capital bu⁄ers during
the business cycle. Our objective is to test whether capital bu⁄ers behave coun-
tercyclically, and whether individual characteristics of the banks in￿ uence their
time-series behavior. We call the attention that the business cycle may a⁄ect
2banks￿capital bu⁄ers both due to supply-side e⁄ects and through demand-side
e⁄ects. In order to overcome this spici￿cation issue, we follow Stolz and Wedow
(2011) and test for asymmetries with respect to the capitalization of banks. Thus,
we specify a partial adjustment model in which capital bu⁄ers this period depend
on last period capital bu⁄ers, on the business cycle, and on other variables con-
trolling for heterogeneity in the risk-behavior of banks.
Using quarterly balance sheet information on the universe of Colombian banks for
the period 1996:1 - 2010:3, we show that capital bu⁄ers vary over the business cy-
cle. However, the behavior of capital bu⁄ers across banks is heterogeneous: big
banks￿bu⁄ers are more responsive to the business cycle. In particular, we ￿nd
that while large banks￿capital bu⁄ers behave countercyclically, there is no statis-
tical evidence that smaller banks￿capital bu⁄ers change over time. We also ￿nd
that increases in the ratio of total loans over assets has an asymmetric e⁄ect on
capital bu⁄ers depnding on banks￿size. While the e⁄ect of an increase in lending
as a proportion of total assets is positive on the capital bu⁄ers of large banks, the
e⁄ect is negative on small banks￿capital bu⁄ers. This interesting result may be
evidence of the short-sightedness of small banks who do not increase their safety
margins when they are assuming higher risks while expanding credit. On the con-
trary, large banks appear to increase their capital bu⁄ers to hedge against pos-
sible negative shocks that can lead to credit risk materialization when loans are
growing fast. Similarly, we ￿nd that while increases in the real growth rate of
loans has a negative impact on capital bu⁄ers for small banks, it has a positive -
though not statistically signi￿cant - e⁄ect on large banks￿bu⁄ers. Finally, we ￿nd
that a prudential regulation introduced in 2007 by the Colombian ￿nancial sys-
tem supervisor, that consisted in establishing a new system for managing credit
risk in Colombian ￿nancial institutions (SARC), has had no signi￿cant e⁄ect in
the time-series behavior of banks￿capital bu⁄ers, although it might have had an
e⁄ect in the level of bu⁄ers of small banks.
This study contributes to the literature on the behavior of capital bu⁄ers in sev-
eral ways. First, up to our knowledge this is the ￿rst paper on the topic that pro-
vides evidence for banks of an emerging economy. The existing literature has fo-
cused on the behavior of banks￿bu⁄ers in Western European economies. There-
fore, our study allows the comparison of results for an emerging economy with
those of developed European economies. Second, Colombia is a bank-based econ-
omy. More than 60% of non-￿nancial ￿rms￿external funds are provided by banks.
3In that sense, the behavior of bank lending in￿ uences importantly ￿rms￿perfor-
mance and investment behavior. Our results can be compared to those of Stolz
and Wedow (2011), who study the case of banks in Germany, a developed bank-
based economy. Third, we have a rich data set comprised of quarterly balance
sheet information for over 15 years of all commercial banks in Colombia. Other
related studies use yearly data, shorter time-periods, or only a sample of the ex-
isting banks. In that sense, our study has informational advantages over previous
studies. Credit cycles in Colombia have been very pronounced. During the years
1998 - 2000 Colombia experienced a major banking crisis which led to changes
in the concentration of the banking industry and to structural changes in the be-
havior of banks toward risk. Therefore, with our data set we are able to test for
the e⁄ects of the banking crisis on banks￿selection of capital bu⁄ers. In contrast,
during 2004 - 2008 Colombia￿ s banking system experimented an extraordinary
period of credit expansion. For instance, in the years 2006 and 2007 the annual
real growth rate of loans exceeded 30%. Credit expansion was so rapid and pro-
nounced that the ￿nancial system·s authorities had to impose regulatory mea-
sures such as marginal reserve requirements.
Finally, our results suggest that capital bu⁄ers of banks with better access to
equity markets tend to vary more over the business cycle. Speci￿cally, security
bu⁄ers of large banks with priviledged access to capital markets behave counter-
cyclically, and this may have negative impacts on macroeconomic stability. An
interesting implication of this ￿nding is that if capital markets develop in such
a way that smaller banks gain more access to them, it will be possible to expect
that capital bu⁄ers of these banks will react more vigorously to the stage of the
business cycle. From a macro-prudential policy perspective, this would suggest
that regulation measures should be undertaken to incentive banks to behave in a
less procyclical way. For instance, regulatory capital meausres that take into ac-
count this aspect could be implemented, particularly in emerging economies in
which capital markets are developing at a rapid pace.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical model,
Section 3 analyzes the data, Section 4 presents the results and robustness checks,
and Section 5 concludes.
42 The empirical model
Our objective is to test whether bank capital bu⁄ers change over the business cy-
cle or not. In order to do so, we follow the methodology proposed by Ayuso et al.
(2004) and Estrella (2004), who study the cyclical behavior of capital bu⁄ers of
banks in Spain and the United States. We use a partial adjustment framework in
which bank i seeks to attain its optimal capital bu⁄er, BUF ￿
i;t, given its observed
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where ￿ represents the speed of adjustment of the observed capital bu⁄er towards
its optimum level, ￿BUFi;t = BUFi;t ￿ BUFi;t￿1, and "i;t is the error term.
Even though the optimal capital bu⁄er of bank i is unobservable, following Jopikii
and Milne (2008) and Stolz and Wedow (2011) it is sensible to assume it depends
on the stage of the business cycle due to its e⁄ect on credit risk and bank-speci￿c
variables. Adding BUFi;t￿1 to both sides of equation (1), we obtain the following
expression:
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where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿). Following the argument above, we instrument the target cap-
ital bu⁄er in terms of observables such as the business cycle, credit risk variables,
ans bank-speci￿c variables. Our empirical speci￿cation is given by equation (3) :
BUFi;t = ￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿)BUFi;t￿1 + X
0
i;t￿ + "i;t (3)
where Xi;t is a vector of control variables that includes the annual GDP growth
rate (GDP), pro￿tability of equity (ROE), the ratio of non-performing loans to
total loans (RISK), the real growth rate of loans (DLOAN), and the loan to as-
set ratio (LOANS). Additionally we included two dummy variables; one controls
for bank size (DUMMY SIZE), separating large banks from small banks, and
5the other one control for the inclusion of SARC in 2007 (DUMMY SARC). We
de￿ne "i;t = ￿i + uit, where ￿i is an idiosincratic component which we assume
uncorrelated with the regressors contained in vector Xi;t, and uit is a white-noise
disturbance term.
All of the variables in equation (3) are de￿ned in levels. Following conventional
wisdom in panel data analysis, we proceed to transform equation (3) into ￿rst
di⁄erences in order to obtain unbiased estimates.
Our main interest relies in the sign of the parameter associated with the variable
GDP. The existing empirical literature suggests this sign is negative, indicating
that capital bu⁄ers behave countercyclically (see, for instance, Stolz and Wedow
(2011)). A negative impact of the business cycle variable on the change in capi-
tal bu⁄ers will indicate that during expansions, when banks are expanding credit,
capital bu⁄ers fall; while during economic contractions capital bu⁄ers increase.
This behavior has been called in the literature "banks short-sightedness" (Borio
et al. (2001)). We test for this hypothesis for the whole universe of banks, and we
test the same hypothesis separating banks according to their size characteristics.
Particularly, we run separate regressions for small banks and for large banks. The
intuition behind performing separate estimations according to bank size is that
large institutions are less exposed to risk because they can diversify their assets
more, because they can achieve economies of scale, or because they likely have
been in business longer (G￿mez-GonzÆlez and Kiefer, 2009). Thus, we expect
a stronger e⁄ect of the business cycle variable on capital bu⁄ers for large banks
than for small institutions.
Note that equation (3) speci￿es a dynamical structure in a panel data context.
For that reason, we employ the dynamic panel data GMM estimator proposed
by Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimation method generalized the method
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), avoidind the weak instruments problem2,
and controlling for speci￿c components in the error term.
3 Data description
We count with a rich data set, provided by the Superintendencia Financiera de
Colombia, which contains quarterly data with balance sheet information on the
2The weak instruments problem appears in models with endogenous regressors in which
using too many instruments may result is biased estimates of the parameters of interest.
6whole universe of Colombian banks for the period 1996:1 - 2010:3. Using this in-
formation we construct the variables mentioned above. It is important to mention
that we de￿ne BUFi;t as the di⁄erence between the observed capital ratio of bank
i in period t and 9%, which is the regulatory level of minimum capital in Colom-
bia3. Figure 1 shows the time-series behavior of bank capital bu⁄ers and GDP.
It can be seen that apparently capital bu⁄ers behave countercyclically. In fact,
the Spearman correlation coe¢ cient between capital bu⁄ers and GDP is of -0.61.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of capital bu⁄ers over time, discriminating by bank
size. It is noticeable that after the banking crisis of the late 1990s small banks
increased their capital bu⁄ers signi￿cantly more than large banks. This can be
explained by di⁄erences in risk aversion of banks of di⁄erent sizes and characteris-
tics.
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3If a bank falls below that capital level it is directly intervened by the Superintendencia
Financiera de Colombia, the supervisor of Colombia￿ s ￿nancial institutions.
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The control variables also vary signi￿cantly over the business cycle. In particu-
lar, the average ROE for the whole sample of banks exhibits negative levels dur-
ing the peiod of economic downturn and positive levels during the period of eco-
nomic expansion, as expected. However, its behavior is heterogeneous depending
on bank size. For large banks, the average ROE is always positive, although it
presents quite di⁄erent levels during moments of expansion and moments of con-
traction. It is also important to note that the growth rate of loans of large banks
during periods of economic upturn (21.9%) is much higher than that of small
banks (12.7%). With respect to RISK, both small and large banks register a
higher indicator during bad times than during good times, as expected, although
both types of banks do not appear to show very di⁄erent behaviors. Finally, the
share of loans out of total assets remains relatively constant during the sample
period for both types of banks (see Tables (1a), (1b), and (1c)).
Note there is a change in the level of bu⁄ers in 2008, especially for small banks.
This change responds to the implementation of SARC and, particularly, to a deci-
sion taken by Colombia￿ s ￿nancial system supervisor of suggesting a higher level
of capitalization to a group of banks at the end of 2008. This change in the level
of bu⁄ers generates a possible unit-root problem in the series of capital bu⁄ers.
That is one of the reasons that led us to model the ￿rst di⁄erence of the series in-
stead of its level. Below we show that the estimation results for the whole sample
period do not change signi￿cantly when data from 2008:4 on is not considered for
the regressions. We also show that the introduction of SARC led to a change in
8the level of small banks￿capital bu⁄ers, but did not change the time-series behav-
ior of their ￿rst di⁄erences.
Table 1a: Average value of regressos by sub-period. Whole sample
Period ROE RISK DLOAN LOANS
1996-1999 -0.011 0.067 0.188 0.663
2000-2003 -0.056 0.076 0.001 0.611
2004-2008 0.193 0.045 0.169 0.610
2009-2010 0.127 0.047 0.067 0.629
Table 1b: Average value of regressos by sub-period. Large banks
Period ROE RISK DLOAN LOANS
1996-1999 0.106 0.068 0.128 0.653
2000-2003 0.023 0.089 -0.027 0.568
2004-2008 0.251 0.043 0.219 0.576
2009-2010 0.228 0.043 0.068 0.602
Table 1c: Average value of regressos by sub-period. Small banks
Period ROE RISK DLOAN LOANS
1996-1999 -0.107 0.067 0.237 0.670
2000-2003 -0.119 0.066 0.024 0.646
2004-2008 0.145 0.047 0.127 0.639
2009-2010 0.026 0.051 0.066 0.656
4 Estimation results
In this section we present the results of estimating equation (4), and we account
for the asymmetric behavior of capital bu⁄ers of small and large banks over the
business cycle. Table 2 shows the estimation results, following the Blundell Bond
(1998) two-step system GMM method, for the capital bu⁄ers of Colombian banks
for the whole sample period (1996:3 - 2010:1). The ￿rst column shows the results
obtained when grouping together all banks, while the second and third columns
show the results when considering separately large banks and small banks, re-
spectively. We performed separate estimations for small and large banks due to
9theoretical expectations and due to the fact that the variable associated to bank
size resulted negative and statistically signi￿cant in the estimation of the whole
sample of banks. We included four lags of the dependent variable in the set of re-
gressors given that we count with quarterly data and considering information cri-
teria. For similar reasons we included the fourth lag of the business cycle variable
(GDP) as a regressor.
The sign of GDP is always negative as expected, indicating that capital bu⁄ers
behave countercyclically. However, this variable is statistically di⁄erent from zero
only for large banks at conventional levels of signi￿cance. This quite interesting
result is similar to the one obtained by Jopikki and Milne (2008)4, who ￿nd that
capital bu⁄ers behave countercyclically for large banks in countries of the EU15.
However, while they ￿nd that capital bu⁄ers of small banks behave prociclically,
we do not ￿nd such behavior in Colombian small banks. Our results suggest that
capital bu⁄ers of small banks in Colombia do not vary over the business cycle. If
both types of banks have the same access to equity markets, and these markets
do not work e¢ ciently, this heterogeneous behavior of capital bu⁄ers will sug-
gest that large banks are more prone to exacerbate business cycle ￿ uctuations
in Colombia than smaller banks. If obtaining capital is equally hard for small and
large banks, those banks that lower their capital bu⁄ers during periods of eco-
nomic expansion are assuming higher risks and will be more likely to fall below
the level of regulatory capital during economic downturns when credit risk mate-
rializes, having to cut lending in order to avoid regulatory penalties. However, if
small and large banks have di⁄erential access to equity markets (see for instance
Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1997)), the reason for observing a heterogeneos behavior
of capital bu⁄ers over the business cycle might be a di⁄erent one. If large banks
have better access to equity markets than small banks, as it is the case in Colom-
bia5, the former can lower their capital bu⁄ers during economic expansions with-
out incurring in major risks, while the latter do not have that possibility. Smaller
banks ￿nd it more costly to re-build their capital stocks, and thus their optimal
4Stolz and Wedow (2011), and other studies, have also found evidence of a countercyclical
behavior of bank capital bu⁄ers for Western European economies. Unfortunately, those papers
have not tested for a heterogeneous behavior of capital bu⁄ers over the business cycle depending
on bank size.
5Private capital markets in Colombia are highly underdeveloped, as it is the case in most
emerging economies. Only a few number of ￿rms issue equity regularly, due to the di¢ culties
of ￿nding demand for equity at a reasonable price. These ￿rms (￿nancial and non-￿nancial) are
large, traditional Colombian ￿rms.
10capital bu⁄er is less responsive to short-run variations of economic conditions.
The fact that large banks￿capital bu⁄ers present a negative co-movement with
the business cycle may have an interesting implication for the transmission of
monetary policy. If during busts the materialization of credit risk leads to a re-
duction of these banks￿capital bu⁄ers to an extend in which they approach the
minimum regulatory level, these banks will have to either raise additional capital
or cut lending. Reducing lending leads to an increase in the capital ratio through
the immediate reduction in risk-weighted assets. Equity capital is relatively costly
in relation to debt because the payments on debt-interest receive tax deductions
and because equity carries the most risk since it has no claim to the company￿ s
assets. Therefore, banks tend to cut lending under this situation, amplifying the
business cycle. The transmission of monetary policy is therefore potentially asym-
metric depending on the bahavior of banks￿capital bu⁄ers over the business cycle.
The signs of the coe¢ cients related to DLOANS and LOANS provide additional
support to our story. The signs of both DLOANS and LOANS is negative and
statistically signi￿cant for small banks, showing that capital bu⁄ers reduce for
these banks when they increase lending. This result is obtained after controlling
for variables related to risk-taking decisions (RISK), and is completely di⁄erent
to the result obtained for large banks, for which the sign of LOANS is positive
and the e⁄ect of DLOANS on the capital bu⁄ers is statistically equal to zero.
Therefore, our ￿ndings suggest that small banks encounter di¢ culties when trying
to increase their capital bu⁄ers due to limited access to equity markets6.
The variable DUMMY SARC is statistically equal to zero in all three speci￿ca-
tions. Therefore, aparently the introduction of SARC in 2007 did not in￿ uence
the behavior of the change in banks￿capital bu⁄ers in Colombia. As shown in ￿g-
ures 1 and 2, the introduction of SARC, and more speci￿caly the decision taken
by Colombia￿ s ￿nancial system supervisor of suggesting a higher level of capital-
ization to a group of banks at the end of 2008, had a one-time (level) impact on
small banks￿capital ratios. However, this regulation did not seem to change the
behavior of capital bu⁄ers over time.
Important to note, under all three speci￿cations we cannot reject the null hypoth-
6In a ￿rst instance, the fact that both DLOANS and LOANS excerpt a negative in￿ u-
ence over BUF could indicate either a riskier behavior of small banks or a lower access of these
banks to capital markets, relative to the access of large banks. However, after controlling for
covariates proxying for risk-taking behavior, the fact that both signs are negative can be inter-
preted as evidence of a limited access to capital markets by small banks in Colombia.
11esis that overidentifying restrictions are valid (Sargan test). Thus, there is evi-
dence that valid instruments are being used.
Table 2: Blundell-Bond two-step system GMM estimates for the capital bu⁄er, 1996:1 - 2010:3





































Observations 1,159 545 614
Sargan test (p-value) 0.99 0.12 0.93
Number of banco 34 16 25
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As mentioned above, there was a change in the level of small banks￿capital ratios
at the end of 2008. As a robustness check of our results, we performed the same
estimations but we reduced our sample period, eliminating all observations after
2008:3. Table 3 presents the results of performing Blundell Bond (1998) two-step
system GMM estimations of the behavior of capital bu⁄ers for the constrained
sample period. Notice that the results are qualitatively identical to those reported
in Table 2 and interpreted above. The magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients
are also very similar, and again under all three speci￿cations we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are valid (Sargan test).
12Table 3: Blundell-Bond two-step system GMM estimates for the capital bu⁄er, 1996:1 - 2008:3





































Observations 1,023 474 549
Sargan test (p-value) 0.99 0.07 0.91
Number of banco 32 15 23
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 Concluding remarks
Using a panel of Colombian banks and data between 1996:1 and 2010:3, we study
the relationship between short-run adjustements in bank capital bu⁄ers and the
business cycle. We follow a partial adjustment framework and control for sev-
eral variables that have been identi￿ed as important determinants of bank capital
bu⁄ers in previous studies, and ￿nd that bank capital bu⁄ers vary over the busi-
ness cycle. We are able to identify a negative co-movement of capital bu⁄ers and
and the business cycle. However, we also ￿nd that capital bu⁄ers of small and
large banks behave asymmetrically during the business cycle. While the former
appear to be constant over time, once the appropriate set of control variables is
used, the latter present a countercyclical behavior.
13We also ￿nd that while when small banks increase lending their capital bu⁄ers
reduce. Meanwhile, increases in lending do not appear to a⁄ect large banks￿capi-
tal bu⁄ers. Given we are controlling for banks￿risk-taking decisions, we interpret
our results as showing that optimally small and large banks behave di⁄erently
due to the di⁄erential access they have to equity markets. Large banks, with bet-
ter access to capital markets, lower their capital bu⁄ers during economic expan-
sions without incurring in major risks while seeking to take advantage of prof-
itable lending opportunities. Small banks ￿nd it more costly to re-build their cap-
ital stocks due to limited access to equity markets, and thus their optimal capital
bu⁄er is less responsive to short-run variations on economic conditions. Our ￿nd-
ings suggest that a change in prudential regulation implemented by Colombia￿ s
￿nancial system supervisor in 2007 has had no impact on the behavior of banks￿
capital bu⁄ers over time. The decision taken by the supervisor of suggesting a
higher level of capitalization to a group of banks at the end of 2008 had a one-
time (level) impact on small banks￿capital ratios but did not seem to change the
dynamic behavior of capital bu⁄ers.
Finally, our results suggest that capital bu⁄ers of banks with better access to
equity markets tend to vary more over the business cycle. Speci￿cally, security
bu⁄ers of large banks with priviledged access to capital markets behave counter-
cyclically, and this may have negative impacts on macroeconomic stability. An
interesting implication of this ￿nding is that if capital markets develop in such
a way that smaller banks gain more access to them, it will be possible to expect
that capital bu⁄ers of these banks will react more vigorously to the stage of the
business cycle. From a macro-prudential policy perspective, this would suggest
that regulation measures should be undertaken to incentive banks to behave in a
less procyclical way. For instance, regulatory capital meausres that take into ac-
count this aspect could be implemented, particularly in emerging economies in
which capital markets are developing at a rapid pace.
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